دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مجله تاریخ ایران 2008-7357 18 2 2025 09 23 The Tudeh Party's Media Positions Regarding Truman's Point Four Aid to Iran During the Mossadegh Administration مواضع رسانه‌ای حزب توده در قبال کمک‌های اصل چهار ترومن به ایران در دورة دولت مصدق 54 80 105832 10.48308/irhj.2025.238482.1396 FA فرهاد نام برادرشاد دانش آموخته دکتری تاریخ انقلاب اسلامی. کارشناس کارشناس اسناد اقتصادی سازمان اسناد و کتابخانه ملی ایران. 0009-0000-5384-9268 مطلب مطلبی استادیار. هیئت علمی پژوهشکده اسناد. سازمان اسناد و کتابخانه ملی ایران، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2025 01 22 With the onset of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was in a fierce confrontation with the United States, seen as a symbol of imperialism. The Soviets viewed economic support and the dispatch of Point Four experts to Iran as an act against the Soviet Union and as part of the promotion of capitalist values. This perception was influenced by the ideological and geopolitical confrontation between communism and the capitalist world. The question of this research, which is presented with a descriptive-analytical method and based on unpublished documents and press, is: What positions did the Tudeh Party, whose goals were in line with Soviet policies, adopt towards the American Point Four experts during the prime ministership of Dr. Mossadegh, and how is the impact of these positions on the change in the approach of the US government to provide Point Four aid to Iran assessed?<br /> Based on the findings, the Tudeh Party, aligned with the global policy of communism, opposed the expansion of American influence and opposed Point Four aid and the American way of life in its affiliated publications. By creating strikes and various tactics of media sabotage in line with its goals, this party tried to make the American aid program appear as a yoke on the shoulders of the Iranians, which was presented by spies pretending to be advisors, to both limit the Mossadegh government and reduce or neutralize the actions of American experts.<br /><strong>Introduction</strong><br />After World War II, the United States, in addition to diplomatic threats, including Soviet pressure and threats to withdraw its troops from northwest Iran, turned to creating economic alliances with a political background and used its technical and technological resources to create a "balance of power" against the Soviet threat. These resources included economic, technical, and security assistance to allies thought to thought to have the potential to help maintain the balance of power of the United States against communist countries. In particular, by assisting  Middle Eastern countries, it tried to prevent Soviet supporters from coming to power. The assistance known as "Truman's Four Principles" was the most important and extensive type of mobilization of American technical resources, which had geographical dispersion, several˟ personneland diversity in various fields of activity.<br />Point Four assistance began in the late 1920s and during the Razm-Ara government (October 17, 1940). The promise of aid under the Four Principles and the implicit support of the United States in nationalizing Iranian oil to the Mossadegh government was presented by the media as an imperialist conspiracy against the Soviet Union. The Soviet press considered the National Front to be the greatest danger because it had sided with the United States in the oil crisis (Katouzian, 1993: 212). In such circumstances, the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party were more inclined towards Britain and its presence in Iran, so that perhaps Iran and the Middle East would remain away from the sphere of American influence. The term "oil mass" that Mossadegh used to describe the supporters of this theory (Katouzian, 1994: 212) supported this perception. Therefore, the main ambiguity of the study is the nature and positions of the Tudeh Party towards Truman's aid under the Four Principles, and it aims to answer this with a descriptive-analytical approach and relying on the press and unpublished documents.<br /><strong>Materials and Methods</strong><br />With the arrival of the American financial advisory board, headed by Arthur Millspaugh, to Iran in 1942, the pro-Soviet front began very early. This may have been instigated by the Soviet government, as the Soviet government was instrumental in expelling the former American financial advisors. From the perspective of the Tudeh Party, this action was interpreted as dependence on America, and for this reason, they viewed the situation of the Mossadegh government with a strong critical view, and even went beyond criticism and began to insult the Mossadegh government and the media destruction of the Americans, and to denounce American imperialism. The anti-American attitude of the Tudeh Party caused them to accuse Mossadegh of being an "agent" and "expert" in imperialist policies, and to distrust the issue of oil nationalization. Another position of the party was related to the nationalization of oil. The Tudeh Party's educational publication wrote about oil nationalization: "This so-called nationalization of oil must expel the British imperialists from Iran to make room for make room for successful American imperialism... The National Front is not unwilling that the nation be so busy with hostility against all the British that they completely forget about American imperialism... American imperialism also wants oil nationalization... The National Front is an illiterate propagandist of nationalism; To separate and distance the struggle of the Iranian nation from the struggle of other nations and to create hostility towards the Soviet country... Finally, to serve American imperialism, they concluded that "the masses should not support the oil nationalization movement that has taken place following the national bourgeoisie." This study, using historical research and documentary analysis, examines the Tudeh Party's approach and its compatibility with Soviet goals towards Truman's Point Four aid to the Mossadegh government, which led to a change in the US approach towards the Mossadegh government, and what media and propaganda tactics did the Tudeh Party use to achieve its goals?<br /><strong>Results and discussion</strong><br />The Tudeh Party considered the increased presence of American advisors to be an obstacle to the formation of various strikes and the pursuit of its goals, because they considered their presence to be equivalent to control of factories and government institutions, suppression of the labor movement, and fire and blood. William Warren, head of the Principal Four Administration of Iran, admitted that in 1952, the health aid of the Principal Four had reduced malaria in some areas by a quarter. The local people also had good relations with them. In the meantime, the Tudeh Party had concentrated all its propaganda power in these villages where the American experts were working.<br />After the Tudeh Party was outlawed in 1948, the party's activities took the form of forming groups and societies called the "National Society for Combating Colonialism" and the "Iranian Society for Peace Supporters," which, in addition to holding demonstrations, published affiliated newspapers such as "Shahbaz" and "Maslhat" to promote Soviet communist goals. Other newspapers of this party include Sangar Solh, Nama Manda, Nama Azarbaijan, Baqoos Hadar, Banh Mardud, Vorar Kar, Ranj O Ganj, and Besoo Aindayad. The content of these publications included various political issues, including denouncing American imperialism. The leftist newspapers tried to prove that the American government fully supported British policies. The party had its own media sabotage tactics against each axis of struggle. The Tudeh Party distorted and ridiculed the issue of improving the breed of cattle and draft animals and breeding draft mules, and used traditional Iranian customs and poems against it. The Tudeh Party newspapers wrote in this regard: "Ah! The great United States is coming to help Iran, and what will Iran gain? How many donkeys! The people are hungry, but what are the results and promises of the wealthy imperialist? How many donkeys?" Moscow Radio also made a provocative move, ridiculing this incident, and every night it talked about the donkeys brought to Iran. Accordingly, the communists were skilled propagandists and acted more cleverly than any group in Iran. Accordingly, the continuation of economic and technical aid, American security assistance to the Mossadegh government, was defined as a hostage to a kind of reform in the Mossadegh government's relations with the communists, headed by the Tudeh Party, and political alliance with the United States.<br />The campaign tactics of the Iranian Tudeh Party were aligned with other communists in other parts of the world and were managed by Soviet sympathizers. In other words, the official position of the Tudeh Party regarding the US's four-point aid to the Mossadegh government was, in principle, in line with the global policy of communism and the Soviet state. The campaigns against American experts were based on anything that could have good media coverage, and their tactics were in line with the changing conditions.<br /><strong>Conclusion</strong><br />The situation of the Tudeh Party and its relations with the Mossadegh government created multifaceted conditions. Although the leaders of the Tudeh Party, including Kianuri, claimed to support and assist the Mossadegh government, the content of the party's press and publications, although not uniform, strongly refuted this claim. On the one hand, the party's closeness to the government and Mossadegh's tolerance of their actions had caused concern in the United States and served as an excuse to delay or prevent the granting of financial assistance under the Fourth Principle of the United States to Iran. On the other hand, it played an important role in distancing the Truman administration from Mossadegh and turning the United States towards the program of "blocking Soviet influence" in Iran; an issue that was emphasized during the Eisenhower administration and led to a change in the American approach towards the National Front and its representative, the Mossadegh government. In the new American perspective, Mossadegh was not known to be a supporter of communism, but his policies destabilized Iran and paved the way for the activities of the only organized party in Iran, the Tudeh Party.<br /><br />  با آغاز جنگ سرد، شوروی در تقابل شدیدی با آمریکا به عنوان نماد امپریالیسم قرار داشت. حمایت اقتصادی و اعزام کارشناسان اصل چهار به ایران، از نظر شوروی به عنوان اقدامی علیه شوروی و به منظور ترویج ارزش‌های سرمایه­داری تلقی می‌شد. این تلقی متأثر از تقابل ایدئولوژیکی و ژئوپلیتیکی کمونیسم با جهان سرمایه­داری بود. بنابراین هواخواهان کمونیسم در ایران، باید شرایط را چنان بر کارشناسان آمریکایی سخت می­کردند که خود مستعفی و از ایران خارج شوند. حزب توده، مهم­ترین نیروی حامی کمونیسم در ایران، از گسترش نفوذ آمریکا در ایران نگران بود و کمک‌های اصل چهار ترومن را تهدیدی برای خود و امنیت ملی ایران قلمداد می­کرد. مسئلة این پژوهش که با رویکرد توصیفی-تحلیلی و با تمرکز بر اسناد منتشرنشده و مطبوعات ارائه شده، این است که حزب توده در دوران نخست­وزیری دکتر مصدق چه مواضع و تاکتیک­های رسانه­ای در مقابل کارشناسان اصل چهار آمریکا اتخاذ کرده بود و آثار این مواضع بر تغییر رویکرد آمریکا در ارائة کمک­های اصل چهار چگونه ارزیابی می­شود؟<br />بر پایة یافته­ها، حزب توده هم‌گرا با مشیِ جهانی کمونیسم، به ضدیت با گسترش نفوذ آمریکا پرداخت و در نشریات وابستة خود، مخالف کمک­های اصل چهار و شیوة زندگی آمریکایی بود. این حزب با ایجاد اعتصابات و تاکتیک­های متنوع تخریب رسانه­ای در راستای اهداف خود، تلاش می­کرد برنامة کمک­های آمریکا را یوغی بر گردن ایرانیان بنمایاند که از سوی جاسوسان مستشار­نما عرضه می­شد تا هم دولت مصدق را محدود و هم اقدامات کارشناسان آمریکایی را کم یا بی­اثر کند. https://irhj.sbu.ac.ir/article_105832_40a42709320510b6a62fc5b99b7d2b90.pdf