دانشگاه شهید بهشتی مجله تاریخ ایران 2008-7357 19 1 2026 03 21 Striving for Maritime Supremacy: Nader Shah, John Elton, and Imperial Rivalries in the Caspian Sea تلاش برای برتری دریایی: نادرشاه، جان التون و رقابت‌های امپراتوری در دریای کاسپی 269 287 106889 10.48308/irhj.2026.243216.1486 FA گودرز رشتیانی گروه تاریخ، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2026 01 08 This study examines the maritime policy of Nader Shah Afshar in the Caspian Sea during the 1740s within the context of Anglo Russian rivalry and the role of John Elton in transferring European technical knowledge to the southern Caspian coast. The study argues that the establishment of a naval force should not be understood merely as a response to the logistical needs of the Dagestan campaign. Rather, it formed part of Nader Shah’s broader strategy to assert Iranian sovereignty and challenge Russia’s maritime dominance. By the early eighteenth century, Russia—benefiting from the reforms of Peter the Great and control of the Astrakhan–Volga corridor—had secured a durable strategic advantage and effectively turned the Caspian Sea into a sphere of influence.<br /><br />Drawing on Russian archival documents and British commercial reports, the findings show that Iran achieved limited success in transferring shipbuilding knowledge and conducting hydrographic surveys through the employment of John Elton and the establishment of shipyards at Chamkhaleh and Mashhadsar. However, the project remained fragile because of the shortage of specialized skills and its dependence on external supply routes. Russia perceived Elton’s activities and the involvement of the Muscovy Company as a threat and adopted a policy of containment. This culminated in the imperial decree of 1746 prohibiting British trade through the Volga route, which disrupted the supply of naval equipment. After Nader Shah’s assassination in 1747, the naval project rapidly declined.<br />Russia perceived Elton’s activities and the involvement of the Muscovy Company as a threat and adopted a policy of containment. This culminated in the imperial decree of 1746 prohibiting British trade through the Volga route, which disrupted the supply of naval equipment. After Nader Shah’s assassination in 1747, the naval project rapidly declined.<br /><strong>Introduction </strong><br />In the early eighteenth century, the Caspian Sea emerged as an important geopolitical zone in the interaction between regional and imperial powers. Control over maritime routes, ports, and commercial corridors in this inland sea was increasingly tied to broader questions of imperial logistics, commercial competition, and strategic mobility. In this context, Nader Shah’s attempt to establish a naval presence in the Caspian Sea represented one of the most ambitious maritime initiatives undertaken by an Iranian ruler in the early modern period. The project aimed not only to strengthen Iran’s military capacity but also to alter the balance of power that had gradually developed in favor of Russia following the collapse of the Safavid state.<br /><strong>Materials and Methods   </strong><br />This study employs a historical‑analytical methodology with an explanatory orientation, grounded in systematic triangulation of contemporaneous English sources, Russian data and scholarship, and Iranian/local textual and material evidence. The research proceeds in four structured stages. First, it reconstructs the geopolitical context of the Caspian region and explains the structural foundations of Russia’s strategic advantage. Second, it analyzes Anglo‑Russian rivalry across logistical, legal, and technical dimensions, drawing on parallel documentary corpora. Third, it examines Nader Shah’s maritime policies and the technical and operational role of John Elton through cross‑comparison of English, Russian, and Iranian accounts. Finally, it synthesizes the internal and external factors underlying the fragility and eventual collapse of the naval program, linking Russian pressures with the institutional breakdown that followed the political fragmentation after 1747. Through this integrated approach, the methodology ensures a rigorous, multi‑perspectival reconstruction of events.<br /> <br /><strong>Result and Discussion </strong><br />In the early eighteenth century, the Caspian region underwent profound transformation driven by the expansion of Russian imperial power under Peter the Great. Russia’s Persian campaign of 1722–1723 allowed it to seize key coastal cities such as Derbent and Baku, and by controlling the Astrakhan–Volga corridor, it integrated the Caspian Sea into its broader logistical and commercial network. This gave Russia long-term strategic leverage over trade and regional access. At the same time, Iran was experiencing political turmoil following the collapse of the Safavid dynasty. When Nader Shah rose to power in the 1730s, he sought to rebuild Iran’s military capacity and reassert control over crucial economic and strategic zones. Within this framework, establishing a naval presence in the Caspian Sea became central to his efforts to counterbalance Russian influence, secure trade routes, and protect the silk-producing provinces of northern Iran. A key element of this initiative was the recruitment of foreign technical expertise, most notably the English shipbuilder and navigator John Elton, whose experience in navigation and cartography was instrumental to the project. Under his direction, shipyards were established along the southern Caspian coast, particularly in Langarud and Mashhadsar, where several armed vessels were constructed. Elton also oversaw hydrographic surveys and mapping operations to improve navigation across the Caspian’s complex coastal zones. These efforts marked one of the earliest attempts to introduce European naval technology into Iran.<br />Nonetheless, the project faced significant structural and logistical challenges. While Iran possessed natural resources such as timber, it lacked domestic production of essential shipbuilding components, including anchors, sails, and navigational instruments. As a consequence, the shipbuilding program relied heavily on imported materials that passed through Russian-controlled trade routes. This dependency created a serious strategic vulnerability, enabling Russia to manipulate or restrict the flow of critical equipment.<br />Simultaneously, the Caspian basin became the scene of Anglo-Russian commercial rivalry. British merchants, particularly those connected to the Muscovy Company, sought to trade European manufactured goods for Iranian silk via the Volga corridor, which was under Russian administrative control. Russia used quarantine regulations, customs procedures, and trade restrictions to exert pressure on British commercial activities. From the Russian perspective, Elton’s cooperation with Nader Shah posed a geopolitical threat by transferring maritime expertise to Iran. In response, Russia intensified diplomatic and economic measures, culminating in 1746 with the revocation of British trading privileges along the Volga route. This decision severely disrupted the logistical foundations of Nader Shah’s naval enterprise.<br />Domestically, the fleet-building program imposed economic strain on local communities, particularly in Gilan, where labor and resources diverted to shipbuilding disrupted agricultural and silk production cycles. Furthermore, the endeavor lacked strong institutional grounding: its success depended primarily on Nader Shah’s personal authority rather than on stable administrative or naval institutions. Following Nader Shah’s assassination in 1747 and the subsequent fragmentation of central authority, these weaknesses quickly became evident. Shipyards were abandoned, naval facilities decayed, and the fleet disintegrated. Ultimately, Nader Shah’s Caspian naval project represented an ambitious yet unsustainable attempt at military modernization—undermined by geopolitical constraints, dependence on foreign expertise, and the fragile institutional foundations of the eighteenth-century Iranian state.<br /> <br /><strong>Conclusion </strong><br />The failure of Nader Shah’s naval project in the Caspian Sea cannot be explained solely by military factors or by the political instability that followed his death. Instead, it reflects a deeper structural imbalance between technological innovation and institutional capacity. While Iran succeeded in acquiring valuable shipbuilding knowledge and maritime expertise through cooperation with foreign specialists, the broader economic and administrative infrastructure required to sustain a permanent navy remained insufficient. At the same time, external geopolitical dynamics played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the project. Russia’s control over key logistical routes enabled it to limit the flow of resources necessary for Iranian naval development. Britain, although initially involved through the activities of its merchants and navigators, ultimately prioritized its diplomatic relationship with Russia and withdrew from active support of the Iranian initiative. Taken together, these factors illustrate the complex interaction between technology, logistics, and international politics in the history of maritime power. Nader Shah’s attempt to create a navy in the Caspian Sea demonstrated the possibilities that could emerge from the transfer of technical knowledge and the mobilization of state resources. At the same time, the rapid collapse of this initiative illustrates the limits of such efforts when they are not supported by durable institutions, secure supply networks, and favorable geopolitical conditions. نوشتار حاضر در صدد بررسی سیاست‌های دریایی نادرشاه افشار در دریای کاسپی طی دهه ۱۱۵۰ق/۱۷۴۰م است و آن را در چارچوب رقابت‌های ژئوپولیتیکی روسیه و بریتانیا و نقش جان التون در انتقال دانش و سازمان‌دهی دریایی اروپایی به سواحل جنوبی این پهنه تحلیل می‌کند. فرض بنیادی پژوهش آن است که تأسیس ناوگان دریایی نادر نه صرفاً پاسخی لجستیکی به الزامات جنگ داغستان، بلکه بخشی از راهبرد دولت‌سازی وی برای اعمال حاکمیت ملی و درهم‌ شکستن انحصار دریایی قدرت شمالی بود. روسیه پیشتر با اتکا به اصلاحات پترِ اول و تثبیت محور آستاراخان–ولگا، مزیتی پایدار ایجاد کرده و دریا را به حوزه نفوذ تقریباً انحصاری خود تبدیل کرده بود. یافته‌های مبتنی بر اسناد آرشیوی روسیه و گزارش‌های بریتانیایی نشان می‌دهد که ایران اگرچه با استخدام جان التون و تأسیس کارگاه‌های چمخاله و مشهدسر در انتقال «دانش فنی» و «نقشه‌برداری» در کوتاه‌مدت موفق بود، اما کمبود مهارت‌های تخصصی، وابستگی شدید به گلوگاه‌های تأمین، و کنترل مرحله‌به‌مرحله روسیه، این پروژه را آسیب‌پذیر و شکننده ساخت. روسیه که حضور التون و فعالیت‌های کمپانی مسکوی را تهدیدی مستقیم برای انحصار ترانزیتی خود می‌دانست، سیاست «خفگی نرم» را به‌کار گرفت و با فرمان ۱۷۴۶م/۱۱۵۹ق مبنی بر ممنوعیت تجارت بریتانیا از مسیر ولگا، شریان حیاتی تأمین تجهیزات ناوگان ایران را عملاً مسدود کرد. با قتل نادرشاه در ۱۱۶۰ق/۱۷۴۷م و فروپاشی تمرکز سیاسی–مالی دولت، این طرح که فاقد ریشه‌های نهادی پایدار بود، از پشتیبانی ساختاری محروم شد و به‌سرعت رو به زوال رفت. برآیند این تجربه نشان داد که اراده سیاسی و انتقال فناوری، بدون «استقلال لجستیکی از محور ولگا» و در غیاب «دیپلماسی متوازن»، توانایی لازم برای مقابله با هژمونی دریایی تثبیت‌شده روسیه را فراهم نمی‌کند. https://irhj.sbu.ac.ir/article_106889_d0dbb37cf227c888b66ee6a12fc2f5fb.pdf